Domestic Pressure and International Climate Cooperation by Tavoni, Alessandro & Winkler, Ralph
 
ISSN 2282-6483	
 
	
	
		 	
Domestic Pressure and 
International Climate Cooperation 
 
Alessandro Tavoni 
Ralph Winkler 
 
 
 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE N°1154 
 
	
	
 
Domestic Pressure and International
Climate Cooperation
October 29, 2020
Alessandro Tavoni1 and Ralph Winkler2
Keywords: international climate cooperation, hierarchical policy-making, domestic pres-
sure, special interest groups, (strategic) delegation
Abstract: In the wake of 25 UN Climate Change Conferences of the Parties (and counting),
international cooperation on mitigating greenhouse gas emissions to avoid substantial and
potentially irreversible climate change remains an important challenge. The limited impact
that the Kyoto Protocol and its successor, the Paris Agreement, have had on curbing emissions
demonstrate both the diculties in negotiating ambitious environmental agreements and the
reluctance of countries to comply with their agreed emission targets once they have joined the
treaty. Therefore, a better understanding of the obstacles and opportunities that the interac-
tions between domestic and international policy pose for the design of successful international
climate cooperation is of utmost importance. To shed light on the roots of the stalemate (and
suggest possible ways out), this article reviews, and draws lessons from, a growing theoreti-
cal, experimental and empirical literature that accounts for the hierarchical interplay between
domestic political pressure and international climate policy.
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Non-technical summary
The world in which climate policies are negotiated, legislations passed and interventions
implemented has thus changed dramatically since the signing of the Paris Agreement. Mean-
while, four more rounds of conferences have taken place (COP26 has been postponed to 2021
due to the COVID-19 pandemic), with disappointing results both at COP24 in Katowice and
COP25 in Madrid. In short, the Paris treaty is under threat, due to an increasing number of
countries opposing coordinated action to address global climate change. An important con-
sequence is that the void left by the lack of international leadership in certain governments
paves the way for lower levels of governance becoming more prominent: domestic actors (e.g.,
cities, rms and citizens) have a much greater role in achieving the agreed target of keeping the
global temperature rise below 2°C. In turn, the new regime’s greater complexity relative to its
top-down predecessor (the Kyoto Protocol), stemming from the multiplicity of actors involved,
increases coordination costs and entails greater scope for strategic interactions between actors
with wide-ranging interests (Chan et al. 2018).
To shed light on the roots of the stalemate (and suggest possible ways out), this article re-
views, and draws lessons from, a growing theoretical, experimental and empirical literature
that accounts for the hierarchical interplay between domestic political pressure and interna-
tional climate policy. This review takes stock of this body of work through the lens of political
economy and game theory, in order to shed light on the strategic incentives for cooperation
at dierent scales and under multiple behavioral and political economy constraints. Speci-
cally, we focus selectively on recent literature that studies how (environmental) cooperation
is aected by the following forms of domestic pressure: electoral delegation (both strategic
and non-strategic), lobbying and media capture by special interest groups, and the impact of
domestic inuences on the depth of (and participation to) international climate policies. The
overarching theme of the review is the focus on a hierarchical notion of policy making: we
concentrate on studies that either explicitly or implicitly shed light on how domestic political
competition in a country aects the country’s international policy. Due to constraints on data
availability, most of the reviewed works are theoretical or experimental, although we have
included a selection of empirical papers on lobbying and media capture.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Despite the perceived success of the Paris Agreement, which was widely acclaimed by many
observers and politicians as a diplomatic breakthrough in international climate policy, anthro-
pogenic climate change remains one of humanity’s most pressing challenges. As with previous
agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol, we observe little progress in climate change mitiga-
tion: in almost all countries, current greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are above the agreed
upon pledges and even complying with these pledges would not achieve the acknowledged
policy goal of containing the increase of the average surface temperature below 2°C compared
to the pre-industrial levels. The main reasons are the public good characteristic of GHG emis-
sion reductions and the absence of a supranational authority that can enforce cooperation.
The landmark deal agreed in Paris late in 2015 indeed managed to secure almost universal
support by essentially allowing states to set their own targets, so as not to impinge on their
sovereignty while attempting to keep the global temperature rise in check. But the very next
year witnessed the Brexit referendum in the UK, which initiated its withdrawal process from
the EU, and the election of Donald Trump in the US. Both instances are often cited for marking
the beginning of the recent surge in anti-globalism and nationalism worldwide, recent man-
ifestations of which are the election of Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil and the spread of the yellow
vests movement within France and in other countries.
The world in which climate policies are negotiated, legislations passed and interventions
implemented has thus changed dramatically since the signing of the Paris Agreement. Mean-
while, four more rounds of conferences have taken place (COP26 has been postponed to 2021
due to the COVID-19 pandemic), with disappointing results both at COP24 in Katowice and
COP25 in Madrid. Michal Kurtyka, who presided COP24 said that the mood among delegates
had changed: “The appetite for multilateral solutions is not as it was in 2015”. UN secretary
general António Guterres voiced similar disappointment after the inconclusive Spanish sum-
mit took place: “The international community lost an important opportunity to show increased
ambition on mitigation, adaptation and nance to tackle the climate crisis.” In short, the Paris
treaty is under threat, due to an increasing number of countries opposing coordinated action
to address global climate change.
An important consequence is that the void left by the lack of international leadership in
certain governments paves the way for lower levels of governance becoming more promi-
nent: domestic actors (e.g., cities, rms and citizens) have a much greater role in achieving
the agreed target of keeping the global temperature rise below 2°C. In turn, the new regime’s
greater complexity relative to its top-down predecessor (the Kyoto Protocol), stemming from
the multiplicity of actors involved, increases coordination costs and entails greater scope for
strategic interactions between actors with wide-ranging interests (Chan et al. 2018).
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An expanding literature has recently developed to tackle the interplay between domestic
and international policy, using theory, experiments and empirics to assess the prospects of co-
operation in the increasingly fragmented “climate commons”. This review takes stock of this
body of work through the lens of political economy and game theory, in order to shed light on
the strategic incentives for cooperation at dierent scales and under multiple behavioral and
political economy constraints. Specically, we focus selectively on recent literature that stud-
ies how (environmental) cooperation is aected by the following forms of domestic pressure:
electoral delegation (both strategic and non-strategic), lobbying and media capture by special
interest groups, and the impact of domestic inuences on the depth of (and participation to)
international climate policies. The overarching theme of the review is the focus on a hierarchi-
cal notion of policy making: we concentrate on studies that either explicitly or implicitly shed
light on how domestic political competition in a country aects the country’s international
policy. Due to constraints on data availability, most of the reviewed works are theoretical
or experimental, although we have included a selection of empirical papers on lobbying and
media capture.
In the following Sections 2 and 3, we discuss the two most important channels of domestic
political inuence, which are (strategic) delegation, and lobbying and media capture, respec-
tively. In Section 4 we rst introduce the two most important international climate policies,
which are international environmental agreement and international permit markets (Section
4.1), before we discuss the nascent literature analyzing the inuence of domestic politics on
international climate policy (Section 4.2). Finally, Section 5 summarizes the main ndings and
advances proposals for future research endeavors.
2 STRATEGIC DELEGATION AND THE PROVISION OF
PUBLIC GOODS
2.1 Theoretical Models of Voting and Delegation
First, we consider instances where the relationship between domestic and international policy
is governed by the “hierarchical” structure of policymaking. The underlying idea is that polit-
ical decisions in modern societies are not made by a single – let alone benevolent – decision
maker. For example, representative democracies typically feature a chain of delegation from
voters to those who govern (Strøm 2000): (i) from voters to elected representatives, (ii) from
legislators to the executive branch (head of government), (iii) from the head of government
to the heads of dierent executive departments, and (iv) from these heads to civil servants.3
3While for autocratic regimes the rst link of this chain is obviously missing, we still observe delegation patterns
as in (ii), (iii) and (iv).
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In all these situations, one party (an agent) acts on behalf of another (the principal). In case
principals delegate to agents who exhibit dierent preferences than they do themselves (e.g.,
more or less concern with respect to climate change) they delegate strategically.
The literature on strategic delegation emerged in the Industrial Organization literature an-
alyzing the delegation of managerial decisions from shareholders to chief executive ocers
(for an excellent survey see Kopel and Pezzino 2018). Subsequently, the concept of strategic
delegation found its way into the literature on negotiation and cooperation (Burtraw 1992,
1993; Crawford and Varian 1979; Jones 1989; Segendor 1998; Sobel 1981), where it has been
utilized in various contexts with inter-agent spillovers, such as environmental policy or the
provision of public goods more generally.4
Siqueira (2003), Buchholz et al. (2005), Roelfsema (2007) and Hattori (2010) analyze strategic
voting in the context of cross-country externalities in a two country setting. Siqueira (2003)
and Buchholz et al. (2005) both nd that voters’ selection of agents is biased toward politicians
who are less concerned about the externality than the median voter. By electing a more “con-
servative” politician, the home country commits itself to a lower tax on the externality, shifting
the burden of abatement to the foreign country. By contrast, Roelfsema (2007) accounts for
emissions leakage through shifts in production and nds that median voters may delegate
to politicians who place greater weight on environmental damage than they do themselves,
whenever their preferences for the environment relative to their valuation of rms’ prots are
suciently strong. However, this result breaks down in the case of perfect pollution spillovers,
such as the emission and diusion of greenhouse gases. Hattori (2010) allows for dierent
degrees of product dierentiation and alternative modes of competition, i.e., competition on
quantities but also on prices. His general nding is that, when the policy choices are strategic
substitutes (complements), a less (more) green policy maker is elected in the non-cooperative
equilibrium.
Strategic delegation in the provision of public goods with cross-border externalities more
generally (but still in a two country set-up) has been examined by Kempf and Rossignol (2013)
and Loeper (2017). The authors of the former paper show that any international agreement
that is negotiated by national delegates involves higher public good provisions than in the case
of non-cooperative policies, taking feasibility, eciency and equity constraints into account.
In their model, the choice of delegates is highly dependent on the distributive characteristics
of the proposed agreement. Loeper (2017) proves that whether cooperation between national
delegates is benecial only depends on the type of public good considered and, more speci-
cally, on the curvature of the demand for the public good but not on voters’ preferences, the
magnitude of the cross-border externalities, nor the size, bargaining power or eciency of
4Strategic delegation is often called “strategic voting” when the principal is the electorate or, more precisely,
the median voter and the elected government is the agent (e.g., Persson and Tabellini 1992).
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each country in providing the public good.
2.2 Lab Experiments on Delegation
There is an extensive experimental economic literature on linear public goods games.5 The
early literature till the mid 1990s found two main results: (i) In one-shot public goods games,
participants’ contributed on average approximately half their endowment to the public good,
which is half-way between the socially optimal contribution and the non-cooperative Nash
equilibrium contribution predicted by non-cooperative game theory. Yet, individual contribu-
tion covered the full range from 0% to 100%. (ii) In environments, where the one-shot public
goods game was played repeatedly, average contributions to the public good started at approx-
imately 50% (as in the one-shot game) and declined with increasing number of repetitions.6
An important question is whether and to what extent delegation can foster public goods
provision within and across groups. Laboratory experiments allow the researcher to disen-
tangle the eect of adding dierent layers of the above-mentioned hierarchical structure in a
controlled manner. Yet, the experimental literature on delegation and public goods provision
is surprisingly sparse.7 Several studies report that the free-riding incentives in public goods
provision within groups can at least be alleviated by dierent institutions of delegation. For
example, Güth et al. (2007) nd that “leading by example”, i.e., one player appointed as leader
(either by election or random assignment) rst contributes, then all other players after observ-
ing the leader’s contribution decide about their own contribution, signicantly increases public
goods provisions. Yet, this leading-by-example eect is drastically reduced if player’s endow-
ments are heterogeneous across players or private information (Levati et al. 2007). Another
institutional design for leadership is that leaders make non-binding contribution suggestions
to players prior to the players’ contribution choices. Levy et al. (2011) show that leaders’ con-
tribution suggestions indeed have an signicant eect on players’ contributions. They nd
that leader suggestions act as upper-bound to the player’s contribution schedules. While on
average leadership has a positive eect on public goods provision, it is detrimental in case that
leaders suggest low contributions. Kroll et al. (2007) investigate whether and to what extent a
non-binding vote on the provision of a public good prior to the contribution stage can increase
5In linear public goods games, n players simultaneously split a given endowment between a private and a public
account. Players’ pay-os are their private accounts plus the total sum over all players to the public account
multiplied by some fraction α (marginal per capita return) with 0 < α < 1 < nα. Under these circumstances,
non-cooperative game theory predicts that, if players only care about their own pay-os, all players assign
the full endowment to the private account, while the Pareto dominating social optimum would be that all
players allocate their full endowment to the public account.
6See Ledyard (1995) and Chaudhuri (2011) for excellent surveys on linear public goods experiments.
7There exists also a small and recent literature testing strategic delegation in other experimental contexts, such
as the ultimatum game (e.g., Choy et al. 2016; Fershtman and Gneezy 2001), the dictator game (e.g., Bartling
and Fischbacher 2012; Hamman et al. 2010) and bargaining (e.g., Schotter et al. 2000).
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public goods provision. They nd that voting alone does not yield substantially higher public
goods contributions. If, however, voting is combined with a costly punishing mechanism, in
which players who deviate from the majority proposal can be punished, signicantly decreases
free-riding incentives.
A related strand of literature studies institutions in which leaders have more formal power
over the other players’ contributions. Oxoby (2013) investigates a one-shot public goods game
in which players can either directly mandate the contributions of others or at least limit their
feasible choice set. He nds that dictated contribution levels are signicantly higher and even
approximate socially ecient levels. Interestingly, if players can dictate dierent contribution
levels for themselves and all other players, almost 70% of players manage to resist the tempta-
tion to free-ride on the mandated contributions of the others. Bolle and Vogel (2011), however,
report that this altruistic behavior deteriorates over time in repeated public goods provision
games. In addition, players voluntarily submit to an institution in which one leader dictates
the contributions of all group members (Fleiß and Palan 2013; Hamman et al. 2011). Another
possible delegation institution is to delegate punishment. Andreoni and Gee (2012) nd that a
“hired gun” that exhibits a non-exclusive power to punish often results in full compliance in
which no punishment is exerted. In addition, punishment – in case it is exerted – is relatively
small and, therefore, cost-eective.
Kocher et al. (2018) is the only paper we are aware o that analyzes delegation in a linear
public goods game across groups. In their setup, nine players are divided into three groups
consisting of three players each. Each group elects a group leader who mandates contributions
to the public good for all members of their group. Public good provision, however, depends
on the contributions on all nine players across all three groups. This setup is most closely
related to the theoretical literature on strategic delegation and public goods provision (see
Section 2.1). However, due to the linear public goods technology, there are no incentives to
strategically delegate to exploit the strategic substitutability of public goods provision choices.
In line with similar experiments of delegation within groups the authors nd that (i) delegation
increased public good provision compared to the case of non-delegation,8 (ii) delegates mainly
refrain from exploiting their group members, and (iii) contributions within groups decline over
time, although slower than in the case of non-delegation.
8However, this eect is exclusively due to alleviating the common action problem within each group, free-riding
incentives across groups remain.
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3 SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS AND DOMESTIC CLIMATE
POLICY
3.1 Lobbying and Environmental Legislation
Established empirical evidence and political economy models demonstrate that public interest
is not the sole objective of politicians. Public ocials are motivated, at least to some degree,
by their own private interests as well, which in turn makes them vulnerable to be swayed by
the inuence of national political competition (e.g., Besley 2006; Bombardini and Trebbi 2020;
Grossman and Helpman 2001; Persson and Tabellini 2000). The importance of lobby groups
in passing or watering down environmental policies has been underscored both in economics
(e.g., Oates and Portney 2003) and in environmental politics (e.g., Markussen and Svendsen
2005; Michaelowa 1998 in Europe and Bryner 2008; Kamieniecki 2006 in the US).
This opportunity for interference has been taken up by lobbyists in an attempt to inuence
political decisions on behalf of individuals and organizations. Such eorts may result in the
proposal of new legislation, or the amendment of existing laws and regulations. At the cost
of oversimplifying, environmental policy-making is frequently portrayed as a competition be-
tween business and environmental lobby groups. Business lobby groups usually aim to limit
the scope of costly environmental measures, while environmental lobby groups do the op-
posite. Below we take a closer look at papers dealing with domestic lobbying, with special
attention on its eect on climate change policy.
Formally, the inuence of lobby groups on incumbent governments is often modeled by
the so called “common agency” approach, originally developed by Bernheim and Whinston
(1986) and extended by Grossman and Helpman in various seminal contributions (Grossman
and Helpman 1994, 1995a,b). In this setting, lobby groups, in a rst step, simultaneously and
non-cooperatively oer “contribution schedules”, i.e., functions specifying the contribution
contingent on implemented policy. In a second step, politicians decide on the policy, taking
into account the contribution schedules of lobby groups. This is also the approach Lai (2007,
2008) employs in two papers to analyze the impact of lobbying on the performance of a domes-
tic emission permit market. Lai (2007) nds in a setting where rm and environmental lobby
groups inuence the decision of the emission cap that the fraction of grandfathered permits
to the industry can act as a policy lever to mitigate the welfare decreasing eect of lobbying.
In Lai (2008) also the amount of grandfathered permits is endogenized and subject to the po-
litical inuence by rm and environmental lobbies. In this case, environmental groups lobby
for grandfathered permits, as this increases the endowment eect of permits for the rms and,
therefore, induce rm lobbies in the second step to lobby for a tighter emission cap to maxi-
mize the value of the grandfathered permits. This contradicts the conventional wisdom that
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rm lobbies are usually in favor of a less stringent emission cap.
Bombardini and Trebbi (2020) is a recent review of the political economy literature on lob-
bying that assesses the degree to which the inuence exerted by special interest groups on the
government is distortive and ultimately costly from the point of view of the electorate. Specif-
ically, they focus on studies that aim to dene and evaluate empirically what the eect on
the ensuing policy is, relative to the counterfactual policy that would have been implemented
absent the political inuence. They conclude that only a handful of studies allow for a clear
estimate of the welfare eects of lobbying, depicting a more nuanced view than that held by
the majority of laypeople in the US, who seem to believe that lobbying is just a tool to distort
public policy.9
What about climate change policy? Is there evidence that lobbying activity is distorting
welfare away from the social optimum? To get a sense of the magnitude of lobbying expendi-
ture on climate change in the US, Brulle (2018) compiles data on lobbying expenditures for the
period 2000–2016 and nds that more than 2 billion US dollars were spent on climate lobby-
ing, accounting for approximately 3.9% of total lobbying expenditure on average (and peaking
in 2009 at about 9 per cent). While large, these gures do not provide a direct answer to the
above question. In principle, it may be the case that lobbying is ineective, for instance because
spending aimed at opposing climate mitigation is matched by an equal amount of expenditures
in support of tighter regulation, resulting in a wasted eort by special interest groups that end
up “burning money” while failing to distort policy.
To causally tackle the above questions, Meng and Rode (2019) investigate the reasons why a
carbon tax is yet to pass in the US Congress. To this end, they analyze the Waxman-Markey cap
and trade bill, which failed to be enacted in 2009. Based on data on rm lobbying expenses re-
lated to this bill, and on a prediction market event study, they infer which rms were expected
to gain or lose from the policy, and by how much. They nd a positive statistically signicant
relationship between the rm lobbying expenditure and how much the policy is expected to
alter its stock prices: such relationship diers between rms expected to gain from the bill
and those expected to lose. Lastly, these relationships are mapped to probabilities of enact-
ment of the policy. The main nding is that rms that are expected to lose from the bill are
more eective at lobbying to lower the likelihood of enactment than rms that are expected
to gain from the bill. Meng and Rode (2019) conclude that, given the greater eectiveness of
oppositional lobbying, the overall lobbying activity decreased the enactment probability of the
Waxman-Markey bill by 13%.
9The authors reference a recent survey from the Pew Research Center that nd that 53% of respondents con-
sidered the role of lobbyists and special interest groups in Washington to be a “very big problem”.
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3.2 Media Capture and Climate Policy
The above section demonstrated how environmental public policy is vulnerable to the dis-
tortive pressure of well-funded lobbyists, at a potentially high cost for the electorate. But
politicians are not the only ones facing a tradeo between satisfying the interests of one group
relative to those of special interest groups. In a similar vein, advertisers may attempt to “cap-
ture” media outlets, so as to bias coverage towards their interests. More precisely, Mungiu-
Pippidi (2013: 41) gives the following denition: “By media capture I mean a situation in which
the media have not succeeded in becoming autonomous in manifesting a will of their own, nor
able to exercise their main function, notably of informing people. Instead, they have persisted
in an intermediate state, with vested interests, and not just the government, using them for
other purposes.”
A recent literature has found evidence of dierent channels of media capture.10 Earlier work
in economics focused on ownership Corneo 2006, bribery (Besley and Prat 2006) and adver-
tising (Petrova 1972). Specically, Corneo (2006) highlights the role of media in informing
citizens’ decisions about alternative policy options. He nds that, especially in societies char-
acterized by large inequalities in wealth, special interest groups are more likely to pressure
and collude with media owners to bias coverage in support of the policy option that is most
advantageous to the interest group (and, possibly, against the public interest). Besley and Prat
(2006) study theoretically the eect of media capture on political outcomes, by modeling me-
dia outlets’ prots as partly driven by commercial relations or collusion with government. To
advance their agenda, media owners either bribe the government or attempt to inuence leg-
islative interventions in industries aecting them. Petrova (1972) focuses instead on the role
of media in manipulating the public opinion, and shows that the problem is more severe in
countries with larger income inequality, since the well-o have more opportunities to pay to
bias information.
Many studies have followed suit and attempted to empirically estimate the eect of media
capture on beliefs about climate change. The underlying question is whether carbon-intensive
rms peddle skepticism through advertising and media capture. Such question is highly con-
sequential, since beliefs are relevant, among other things, for voting decisions.11
Much of the climate change economics literature agrees by answering with a qualied yes
to the above question. Here we briey review some relevant papers.12 Based on a study of
newspaper coverage in the US, Boyko and Boyko (2004) nd that over half of a random
10See Schirin (2017) for a review.
11Della Vigna and Kaplan (2007) illustrate the eect of the entry of Fox News in cable markets: Republicans
gained vote share in towns that broadcast Fox News. Relatedly, Gentzkow (2006) shows that television may
also inuence the voter turnout.
12See Washington and Cook (2011) for a comprehensive review of the literature that demonstrates that carbon-
emitting industries are among the largest funders of climate-skeptical research.
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sample of articles deny climatic change or refer to it in terms of natural uctuations. Boyko
(2008) nds further evidence of biased reporting when analyzing US television news, which
are more heavily funded by advertising, and typically owned by larger and more concentrated
companies, compared to the national print media.
Shapiro (2016) models the mechanism behind information diusion, with a view to under-
standing when public policy is likely to reect the best scientic information, and to study
the eect of the institutional design of the news media on the quality of reporting. He nds
that “the gap between the equilibrium policy and the ideal policy is wider the greater is the
likelihood that the facts are unambiguous, because special interests have an especially strong
incentive to manufacture counter-claims in the face of unambiguous evidence.” The paper then
tests and nds empirical support for this prediction in the context of climate change. Specif-
ically, public acceptance of climate change is greater in countries where media abstain from
reporting skeptics’ claims.
Lastly, Beattie (2019) nds empirical evidence of climate change-related media capture in the
US by the automotive industry (which generates almost two-thirds of newspapers revenues
through advertisements), especially for high emission vehicles such as trucks. He estimates
the eect of advertising on coverage and nds a negative relationship between potential ad-
vertising from car manufacturers and the environmental tone (and amount) of climate change
coverage. As a result, coverage of climate change is more skeptical than it would have been in
the absence of advertising.
4 INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE COOPERATION UNDER
DOMESTIC POLITICAL ECONOMY CONSTRAINTS
This section builds on the analyses reviewed thus far. It concentrates on how the domestic
pressures aimed at steering the policy makers and public opinion in the direction preferred by
special interest groups play out at the international stage.
With respect to international climate policy we tend to observe two dierent approaches.
On the one hand, the UNFCCC (United Framework Convention on Climate Change) governs
and conducts regular global negotiations, which resulted in large multilateral agreements such
as the Kyoto Protocol or the Paris Agreement. On the other hand, there are bilateral or regional
initiatives, a prime example of which are the linking of permit markets, such as the Western
Climate Initiative (WCI) and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in North America.
Both the existing theoretical and experimental economic literature analyze both of these
approaches to international climate cooperation predominantly under the assumption that
countries behave as individual actors. In addition, the theoretical literature mostly applies a
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partial equilibrium framework in which countries’ domestic welfares only comprise of some
benets due to domestic GHG emissions and environmental damages depending on the global
level of GHG emissions. Although the experimental literature usually nds more cooperation
than predicted by theory (see Section 2.2), the overall conclusion is rather pessimistic regarding
the prospects of international environmental cooperation.
In the following, we briey review the established literature dealing with international envi-
ronmental agreements and international emission permit markets, before revisiting the mech-
anisms that we reviewed in Sections 2 and 3, but with a focus on models that specically ad-
dress the repercussions of electoral delegation and domestic lobbying on international climate
policy.
4.1 International Environmental Agreements and Emission Permit Markets
Since the 1990’s one strand of economic literature has explored the possibilities of interna-
tional (environmental) cooperation by analyzing the formation and stability of so-called self-
enforcing13 international agreements in a multi-stage game theoretical model: In the rst stage
countries decide whether to join a climate coalition. In the second stage coalition members are
assumed to cooperate by choosing emission levels that maximize their joint pay-o, while non-
coalition members set emission levels maximizing their domestic welfare only. This game de-
sign is also known as coalition formation game. The pioneering contributions of Barrett (1993),
Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) and Hoel and Schneider (1997), among others, have been ex-
tended along various dimensions: participation constraints (e.g., Carraro et al. 2009; Weikhard
et al. 2015), uncertainty and learning (e.g., Finus and Pintassilgo 2013; Kolstad 2007; Kolstad
and Ulph 2008), international trade (e.g., Eichner and Pethig 2013, 2015) and technology in-
vestments (e.g., Barrett 2006; Battaglini and Harstad 2016; Goeschl and Perino 2017; Harstad
2016; Helm and Schmidt 2015) and the possibility of cooperating countries to agree on modest
emission abatement targets (e.g., Finus and Maus 2008; Harstad 2020), to name just a few.14 In
general, this literature derives rather pessimistic predictions about international environmen-
tal cooperation: Stable coalitions are either ambitious (with respect to emission reductions)
but small or large but modest (again, with respect to emission reductions). In either case, self-
enforcing environmental agreements achieve only modest reductions of global GHG emissions
against “business-as-usual” (BAU) emissions.
As a consequence, another strand of economic literature has explored the potential of mar-
ket based institutional designs to facilitate international environmental cooperation. Most no-
13Self-enforcing means that sovereign countries are reluctant to join or comply with an agreement, as long as
this is not in their own self-interest.
14For comprehensive surveys of this literature see, e.g., Barrett (2003), Finus (2008), Wagner (2001) and de Zeeuw
(2015).
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table is the formation of international emission permit markets in which permits can be non-
discriminatorily traded across all participating countries (e.g., Flachsland et al. 2009; Green
et al. 2014; Jae et al. 2009). On the one hand, international permit markets promise e-
ciency gains, as marginal abatement costs are equalized across rms and countries, which is a
necessary condition for eciency (Montgomery 1972). On the other hand, it is not straightfor-
ward how the permit cap in the combined market is determined. While some authors assume
that domestic permit allocations remain unchanged by switching from separate markets to a
combined market and study other frictions that may outweigh the eciency gains and thus
prevent linking (e.g., Babiker et al. 2004; Doda and Taschini 2017; Doda et al. 2019), another
strand of literature assumes that permit allocations are chosen strategically after countries
decided whether to join their permit markets (Helm 2003; Helm and Pichler 2015; Holtsmark
and Midttømme 2019; Holtsmark and Sommervoll 2012). In these settings, countries rst de-
cide whether to join an international permit market and, in a second step, non-cooperatively
choose domestic endowments of emission permits. As a consequence, the total amount of
permits in such a trading scheme is not necessarily ecient. In fact, some countries might
be tempted to issue more permits than they would do in the absence of international trade in
permits, because they might gain from selling permits to other countries.
Yet, even in case of strategically chosen domestic emission permit endowments, interna-
tional permit markets exhibit substantial potential for GHG reductions under certain circum-
stances. In particular, linking the permit markets of countries with high carbon eciency (i.e.,
high marginal benets of GHG emissions) and high willingness to pay for emission reductions
(i.e., high marginal damages) and countries with low carbon eciency and low willingness
to pay leads to a Pareto improvement, in which eciency gains due to equalizing marginal
abatement costs are realized and total emissions decline. Carbone et al. (2009) demonstrate in
a calibrated general equilibrium model that the highest GHG emission reductions would be
achieved by establishing an international emission permit market among the EU, the Former
Soviet Union and China. Yet, also this coalition achieves GHG emission reduction that only
bridges half of the gap between BAU emissions and the globally optimal GHG emission levels.
4.2 Hierarchical Interplay between Domestic Political Pressure and
International Climate Policy
All of the aforementioned literature shares the assumption that countries are considered as
unitary actors, such as benevolent governments, acting in the best interest of the country
as a whole. As discussed in Sections 2 and 3, this view on domestic policy is too simplistic.
By neglecting any internal political structure of countries any possible interactions between
domestic and international (environmental) policy are lost.
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In a recent paper, Battaglini and Harstad (2020) show that domestic political competition
may have an important impact on the design and the eectiveness of international agreements.
In a model, in which a home country exerts an externality on a foreign country, they show that
the political competition for reelection of an incumbent government with a rival party may
lead to “weak” treaties, i.e., agreements with control and sanctions mechanisms which cannot
ensure that the treaty is obliged with independently of who wins the next election. While these
treaties are always inecient from a social welfare perspective, it is in the best interest of the
incumbent government to negotiate a weak treaty if the pay-o of reelection is suciently
high. The reason is that the incumbent government can increase its reelection probability by
a weak treaties, as this allows the incumbent government to further dierentiate itself from
the competing party.
In the political science literature, Putnam (1988) described the relationship between domes-
tic and international policy as a two-level game: A country’s negotiator (e.g., the head of
government) is well aware that any treaty agreed upon on the international level will have to
be ratied by the respective governmental body in her own country (and also the other coun-
tries) before entering into force. Anticipating potential obstacles to ratication will, in general,
impact on the negotiator’s bargaining behavior on the international level. In a recent paper,
Köke and Lange (2017) adopt this view on the relationship between domestic and international
climate policy in a political economy set-up, in which the negotiator and the legislator (i.e.,
the agent that is decisive for domestic ratication) dier in their preferred emission reduction
target. They nd that larger coalitions with less ambitious emission targets prevail.15 While
the negotiator and the legislator in Köke and Lange (2017) are supposed to exhibit dierent
preferences with respect to emission abatement, this dierence is exogenously given. Thus, it
is not explored how they may depend on each other.
A powerful link between domestic and international (climate) policy is the inuence of
special interest groups on incumbent governments, as discussed in Section 3. Employing a
common agency approach to lobbying, Habla and Winkler (2013) analyze the formation of an
international emission permit market when the governments of countries are inuenced by
special interest groups. Governments are supposed to be subject to lobby contributions in both
stages: rst, when they decide to link domestic permit markets to an international market and,
second, when they decide on the amount of permits issued to the domestic industry. They nd
the counterintuitive result that lobbying may “backre”, i.e., an increase in power of a partic-
ular lobby group may result in a policy change that is considered worse by the lobby group.
The reason is that an increase in a lobby group’s power has direct and indirect eects. While
15Interestingly, their model set-up, apart from the political economy framework, essentially reverses the se-
quence of decisions compared to the standard model in the literature on self-enforcing international agree-
ments. First, countries decide on the emission targets for treaty members and, second, members decide
whether to join.
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the direct eect leads to a policy change in the desired direction in the own country, there is
an indirect eect in the opposite direction on the government of the other country (because
of the strategic substitutability of emission permit choices), which may outweigh the direct
eect.
Cheng and Chu (2020) also analyze the inuence of lobbying on the performance of an in-
ternational emission permit market, yet they assume that polluting rms are subject to both
an international permit market regime and, in addition, a domestic emission tax.16 In contrast
to Habla and Winkler (2013) they take the formation of an international emission permit mar-
ket as given and concentrate on the inuence of lobbying on domestic and global emissions.
In the most realistic regime, in which lobby groups can only inuence the domestic emission
tax but not the emission permit issuance, they nd that an international permit markets is
particularly benecial in reducing global emissions if the rm lobby is strong and the envi-
ronmental lobby is weak. The reason is that the international permit market determines the
level of global emissions. Thus, an international permit market acts as safeguard against the
emission increasing inuence of rm lobby groups in case of only a domestic emission tax.
Marchiori et al. (2017) analyze the formation of a self-enforcing international environmental
agreement when governments’ emissions choices are inuenced by an industry and an envi-
ronmental lobby group. While these lobby groups only exert political inuence in the second
stage, i.e., on the emission levels of countries, this second stage inuence percolates into the
rst stage decision, as it is anticipated by governments when making the decision whether
to join the international agreement. They show that a strong industry lobby and/or weak
environmental lobby reduces the emissions abatement of participating countries and, thus,
may increase participation. Whether the increase in participation outweighs the lower abate-
ment eort of participating countries crucially depends on the number of countries joining
the agreement.
Lastly, we take another look at delegation, as discussed in Section 2. In the context of hi-
erarchical international climate policy, delegation can take on various forms. For example,
governments may chose and send delegates to international negotiations like in Köke and
Lange (2017). Another form of delegation is found in representative democracies, where vot-
ers elect a government that takes decisions on their behalf. Anticipating the interaction of
the elected government with other (elected) governments in some form of international (cli-
mate) cooperation may lead the median voter to strategically elect a government that exhibits
dierent preferences than she has herself. This kind of set-up is often called strategic voting.
In a model consistent with several interpretations of strategic delegation, Habla and Win-
kler (2018) analyze the formation of international emission permit markets. They nd that
16The UK established a carbon tax that essentially acted as a price oor for CO2 emissions even for installations
regulated under the EU-ETS. Whenever the permit price in the EU-ETS is below the domestic carbon tax,
rms are subject to both, the international permit market and the domestic carbon tax.
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principals have an incentive to delegate strategically and choose agents that exhibit less green
preferences than they do themselves. This even holds if emission choices are dominant strate-
gies in autarky, because of the strategic substitutability of emission permit choices that arises
from the trade in permits. Permit sellers, in particular, have an incentive to delegate to agents
that have much less concern for the environment. This incentive to strategically delegate
renders the linking of domestic permit markets to an international market less protable, in
particular for permit buyers. They conclude that this may explain why we hardly observe
linking of permit markets in reality, despite their seemingly favorable characteristics.
In a model framework similar to Finus and Maus (2008), i.e., cooperating countries may
agree on more modest emission abatement targets instead of full internalization of emission
externalities among all participating countries, Spycher and Winkler (2018) analyze the forma-
tion of self-enforcing environmental agreements when governments can strategically delegate
emission choices. They nd that principals in all countries have an incentive to delegate to
agents with lower environmental concerns than they exhibit themselves. This strategic del-
egation incentive is increasing with the number of countries that joined the agreement for
principals in non-participating countries, and decreasing for principals of countries joining
the agreement. In addition, principals in countries that joined the IEA delegate such that they
crowd out all eorts to increase coalition sizes by less ambitious agreements. In summary,
strategic delegation weakly decreases the number of participating countries and strictly in-
creases global GHG emissions.
An additional layer of delegation can be found in federal countries, where the federal gov-
ernment may choose to delegate particular decisions to the state governments. Foucart and
Wan (2018) analyze the provision of global public goods, such as climate change mitigation, in
a strategic federation framework. In the rst step, countries decide on the political structure
by either leaving public good provision in the hands of the individual states (de-centralization)
or to delegate public good provision to the federal government (centralization). In the second
step, the responsible entities non-cooperatively decide on their public good provision. On the
one hand, centralization oers potential gains by internalizing the exernalities within a feder-
ation, on the other hand decentralization allows to more aggressively free-ride on the public
good provision of other providers, either within or across countries. In fact, depending of the
preference of the public good and their heterogeneity across states, decentralization can be in
the best interest of all the members of a federation, as it acts as a commitment to free-riding.
Yet, it decreases global public good provision.
Two recent experimental papers complement the aforementioned theoretical literature by
studying the eect of delegation in the provision of threshold public goods, a class of games
which is of particular importance in the context of (abrupt) climate change.17 Milinski et al.
17In threshold public goods games a public bad can only be avoided if contributions to a public fund exceed
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(2016) investigate delegation in a threshold public goods game. Six groups of three players each
contribute to a public account over ten rounds. Within each group, one player is either ran-
domly selected or elected by the other players to make contributions on behalf of the group. If
the public account is below a certain threshold after ten rounds, there is a 90% probability that
private accounts are lost. They compare outcomes of this treatment with delegation to simi-
lar treatments without delegation of eighteen and six players. While group investments and
also the probability that the threshold is reached do not signicantly vary across treatments,
they nd some evidence (only statistically signicant in some treatments) that players in the
delegation treatment elect representatives who contribute less than average in order to extort
higher contributions from other groups, in line with the literature on strategic delegation and
public goods provision.
The second experiment explores the relationship between delegation and public pressure
in a threshold public goods game. İriş et al. (2019) randomly assign twelve subjects into four
teams, and ask each team to elect a delegate through majority voting. The elected delegates
play several variants of a one-shot threshold public goods game, in which losses can ensue if
the sum of their contributions falls short of a threshold and earnings are split evenly among
the team members. They nd that when delegation is coupled with public pressure, it has
a signicantly negative eect on contributions, even though the constituency can only exert
mild pressure on the delegate, in the form of suggested contributions. The reason is that
delegates give more weight to the least cooperative suggestion: they focus on the lower of the
two public good contributions recommended by their teammates.
5 CONCLUSIONS
Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, the mitigation of anthropogenic climate change remains one
of the most important challenges humanity currently faces. Although there is a widespread
consensus on the long-term policy goal that the increase of the average surface temperature
should be contained below 2°C compared to the pre-industrial level, the international com-
munity consistently fails to coordinate on appropriate measures. As a consequence, a better
understanding of the obstacles and opportunities that the interactions between domestic and
a particular threshold. The relationship to anthropogenic climate change is as follows: only if greenhouse
gas emission abatements are provided on a globally sucient level, the temperature increase against pre-
industrial levels can be contained below a certain threshold, say 2 °C, in order to prevent drastic and maybe
irreversible consequences of climate change. In contrast to linear public goods games, which are always
prisoners’ dilemma games, threshold public goods games are coordination games with two sets of stable Nash
equilibria if the public good provision technology is suciently ecient (or the public bad suciently severe):
(i) an inecient equilibrium in which no player contributes and (ii) a set of ecient equilibria in which the
threshold is just met and, thus, the public good is provided (or the public bad prevented, respectively). See
Barrett and Dannenberg (2012); Bosetti, Heugues, and Tavoni (2017); Dannenberg et al. (2015); Milinski et al.
(2008); Tavoni et al. (2011) for threshold public goods experiments on climate change mitigation.
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international policy pose for the design of successful international climate cooperation is of
utmost importance.
The existing literature on international (environmental) cooperation, as discussed in Sec-
tion 4.1 shows that it is exceptionally dicult to achieve the global social optimum in climate
change mitigation (or public goods provision, in general), even when considering countries
as unitary actors. The main reasons are (i) the public good characteristic of GHG gas emis-
sion abatement, (ii) the absence of a strong supranational institution to enforce international
cooperation and punish non-participation and non-compliance, and (iii) the heterogeneity of
countries. In addition, the general result from a recent theoretical literature on the relationship
between domestic and international climate policy, which we discussed in Section 4.2, nds
that considering the interactions between domestic and international climate policy renders
international cooperation even more dicult (e.g., Buchholz et al. 2005; Habla and Winkler
2013, 2018; Marchiori et al. 2017; Siqueira 2003; Spycher and Winkler 2018). The reason is that
emission choices are strategic substitutes in the standard partial equilibrium model employed
in this literature when marginal damages of global emissions are increasing. This general
result is conrmed by experiments that study strategic delegation in threshold public goods
games (e.g., İriş et al. 2019; Milinski et al. 2016.
Yet, it is not clear whether emission choices are necessarily strategic substitutes. It is well
known that richer model designs create incentives in the direction of strategic complementar-
ity. For example, international trade in goods may render emission choices strategic comple-
ments rather than substitutes (e.g., Copeland and Taylor 2005; Eichner and Pethig 2013, 2015;
Hattori 2010). The reason is that, in addition to the direct strategic eect, which is always
negative (i.e., emission choices are strategic substitutes), there is an impact of the change in
the world goods prices induced by the changes in other countries’ emission levels. This terms-
of-trade eect can be either positive or negative. If the price eect is positive and suciently
strong it may even outweigh the direct strategic eect. In this case, the respective country
views the emission choices of all other countries as strategic complements. This would re-
verse the impact of strategic delegation on international public good provision. Instead of
delegating to agents with less green preferences, principles would choose agents with higher
concern for the environment than they exhibit themselves, which would partly mitigate the
underprovision of global GHG abatement.
While we are not aware of any papers in this direction and we consider this an important
and fruitful avenue for future research, we do not believe that the eects of strategic comple-
mentarity are strong enough to bring global GHG emissions down to ecient levels.18 Yet,
there is another perspective on delegation. In the hierarchical policy setting discussed in this
18Because in this case the provision of global public goods is not a prisoner’s dilemma but a coordination game
and ecient provision would be (relatively) easy to achieve. This is not what we currently observe with
respect to climate change mitigation.
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review, principals have an incentive to strategically delegate, as this acts as a credible com-
mitment device to bind oneself to a future policy: if emission choices are strategic substitutes,
emission choices are delegated to agents with less green preferences because it is correctly
anticipated by the other countries that this agent will decide on a less stringent climate policy
than the principal would have done. The combined eect of the governance structure of rep-
resentative democracies and the strategic substitutability of emission choices thus lead to an
amplication of the issue of underprovision of a global public good such as GHG mitigation.
Yet, delegation could also be strategically used in the design of international climate policy.
For example, countries setting up an international permit market will need an institution that
conducts the international trade of permits. Also the decision regarding the fraction of permits
to be grandfathered to rms in all participating countries could be delegated to this institution
to safeguard the international permit market against detrimental inuences of domestic lobby
groups in the individual countries’ choices of emission permit issuance.19 While delegation in
such an international setting has to be benecial to all countries, otherwise they would not
consent to it, it is conceivable that at least under certain circumstances this is case. To the best
of our knowledge, the economic literature on international climate policies has not yet started
to explore the role of delegation in the design of international treaties. In our opinion, this
would be another promising direction for future research.
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